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Optimality Modeling and Explanatory
Generality
Angela Potochnik†‡
The optimality approach to modeling natural selection has been criticized by many
biologists and philosophers of biology. For instance, Lewontin (1979) argues that the
optimality approach is a shortcut that will be replaced by models incorporating genetic
information, if and when such models become available. In contrast, I think that
optimality models have a permanent role in evolutionary study. I base my argument
for this claim on what I think it takes to best explain an event. In certain contexts,
optimality and game-theoretic models best explain some central types of evolutionary
phenomena.
1. Introduction. The optimality approach offers a way to model natural
selection purely phenotypically, without directly representing the system
of genetic transmission. This approach includes both optimality models
and game-theoretic models, which are used when trait fitnesses are fre-
quency-dependent. One determines the range of possible values for some
phenotype and the fitness function relating these phenotypes to the en-
vironment. Based on this information, the model predicts which pheno-
typic value(s) will predominate in the population, given enough time in
that environment. Modeling long-term evolutionary change in this manner
results in information regarding the effect of the selection pressure(s) at
work and any constraints arising from, for example, the process of genetic
transmission or development.
Various concerns about the reliability and long-term value of optimality
modeling have been raised by population biologists and philosophers of
biology. One thought is that, though optimality models are a helpful
substitution when genetic information is unavailable, they should even-
tually be replaced by models that explicitly incorporate genetic infor-
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mation. Lewontin (1979) articulates such a view. He takes optimality
modeling to be a shortcut approach that does not truly capture the dy-
namics of evolutionary change. In his view, a truly dynamical theory of
evolution will “predict the evolutionary trajectory of the community . . .
on a purely mechanical basis” (1979, 6). This requires the incorporation
of genetic dynamics into models of natural selection. Lewontin thus thinks
that, if and when it is possible, the optimality approach should be replaced
by models that explicitly represent the dynamics of genetic transmission.
In contrast to this position, I here develop a case for employing op-
timality models on a long-term basis, regardless of the availability of
genetic information. It is true that phenotypic models shortcut the genetic
dynamics crucial to evolutionary change. However, optimality models
capture other important aspects of the dynamics of evolutionary change.
In particular, these models represent the fitness-conferring interactions
between organisms and their environment. Because of this, and because
of features of scientific explanation for which I will argue below, I think
that in some important contexts, optimality models best explain certain
evolutionary phenomena.1 In my view, the long-term importance of the
optimality approach is assured by its role in evolutionary explanation.
2. Generality, Complexity, and Explanation. Advocates of the causal ac-
count of explanation argue that causal factors leading to an event comprise
the explanation of that event. From this, the question arises: which of
the causal factors leading to an event should be included in an explanation
of that event? Simply claiming that explanation is causal does nothing to
sort out which parts of a welter of causal detail should be included in an
explanation. Even if all causal factors are potentially of explanatory rel-
evance, there is the issue of which of these factors should, ideally, be
included in an explanation of the event. Here I sketch an answer this
question.
One possibility is that an explanation should be maximally inclusive of
causal factors leading to the event to be explained. The idea behind this
is that a causal explanation stands only to benefit from the inclusion of
1. The issue at stake is not whether optimality and game-theoretic models yield accurate
predictions. I instead ask whether (sufficiently accurate) phenotypic models offer ex-
planations that, in some cases, are better than other types of explanations, including
those offered by (sufficiently accurate) models incorporating genetic information. See
Sober (2003) on the distinction between the questions of truth and explanatory worth.
Relatedly, my argument is not one of abductive inference, or inference to the best
explanation. I presume throughout this paper that the candidate explanations are all
taken to be true. The question is not which model we should believe is accurate of the
phenomenon to be explained, but which (accurate) model best explains the phenom-
enon.
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additional information about the causes of the event to be explained.
Simply string all available causal information together, and the result is
the best explanation that is currently possible. Yet I do not think that the
strategy of maximal inclusion leads to the best explanations. This is most
clear when explaining events that result from highly complex causal pro-
cesses.
Many events result from the combination and interaction of a large
number of causal factors. For such events, there are many factors that
influence the event to be explained. Cumulative evolutionary change is
exemplary of such a complex causal process. Consider, for instance, the
fixation of some physical trait in a population, due to evolution by natural
selection. For such a case, causal factors include aspects of the popula-
tion’s genotypes, of its environment, and of the developmental processes
leading from genotype to phenotype. Additional factors include popu-
lation size, amount of inbreeding and migration; the list goes on. The
strategy of maximal inclusion is not effective for such complex causal
processes, for it would result in exceedingly involved explanations. Even
when constructing such an elaborate explanation is even possible, we
seldom or ever explain this way. Instead, some subset of the multitude of
causal factors is focused upon, circumscribed temporally and often in
other ways as well.
If the principle of maximal inclusion is wrong, then explanations should
instead feature some subset of the causal factors leading to the event to
be explained. This is so at least for events that result from a complex
causal process, such as evolution. In my view, this is a natural result. No
explanation can trace back the causal chain indefinitely; maximal inclusion
is in this sense unobtainable. Aiming to include only some subset of the
causal factors places a limit on the cognitive load produced by ideal
explanations. This accords well with actual scientific practice. It respects
the division of labor that exists among distinct fields and subfields of
science. A population with a particular physical trait—my example here—
may be studied variously by developmental theorists, evolutionary ecol-
ogists, and population geneticists. Each focuses upon a different subset
of the causes that influence the outcome.
If I am correct that the best explanation of an event is comprised of a
subset of causal factors, then the question arises: What rules determine
which causal factors should be included in the explanation and which
should be neglected?2 In my view, the best explanation of an event E is
a model that
2. Strevens (2004) answers this question by developing a restrictive notion of difference
making that eliminates from an explanation much of the causal network leading to
the event to be explained. However, I do not think Strevens’s account sufficiently
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1. represents the causes of E that figure into the causal relationship of
interest in the particular context of inquiry at hand;
2. satisfies the criteria of explanatory adequacy; and
3. is maximally general within these constraints.
The first and second conditions determine what information should be
included in the best explanation of an event. The third condition decides
what information should be neglected by an explanation.3
I have argued that maximal inclusion of causal factors does not result
in the best explanations. The alternative of citing only a subset of causes
creates a tricky situation, though. This results in the systematic neglect
of some causes of an event from that event’s explanation. The reason that
such neglect is not problematic, in my view, is that which causes should
be included in an explanation varies, even for a single explanandum. The
context of inquiry is determined by the interests of those seeking the ex-
planation. Different research programs approach an explanatory problem
from different angles. These interests help to determine which causes must
be included in the best explanation of the event in question. Those parts
of the causal process picked out by the applicable research interests are
the causal factors that an explanation must include, in that context of
inquiry.
As an example, consider explaining why most or all members of a
population have some particular phenotype. Approaching the question
with a research interest in development and with an interest in evolution
result in two different explanatory strategies, familiar from discussions of
evolutionary explanation. These regard the proximate and ultimate (or
distal) causes of the trait, respectively (Mayr 1961). In my view, these
distinct explanatory strategies, each focusing on a different subset of
causal factors, exist because the explanations are formulated in two dif-
ferent contexts of inquiry. A developmental biologist is primarily inter-
ested in the causal relationships involved in development. A population
biologist, in contrast, is primarily interested in the causes and effects of
selection and transmission. Such distinct research foci result in distinct
explanatory strategies.
The role of the context of inquiry in determining what causes should
be included in an explanation yields the first condition that must be met
restricts the factors cited in an explanation. Maximal inclusion of just Strevens’s dif-
ference makers faces the same problems discussed above.
3. This formulation assumes that explanations are provided by models. Such a for-
mulation is adequate for my present purposes, for I aim to establish the explanatory
importance of a type of population biology model. However, I am not committed to
the idea that only models explain events.
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by a fully satisfactory, ‘best’ explanation. This is the requirement that an
explanation represent the causes of the event to be explained that figure
into the causal relationship of particular interest in the context of inquiry
at hand. The second condition limits the degree to which the context of
inquiry can shape the explanation. The best explanation of an event must
meet what I term the criteria of explanatory adequacy.
Imagine that research interests steer one toward a set of causes that
would not have led to the event to be explained, had they not occurred
in conjunction with certain other factors. The best explanation of an event
must, it seems, cite some set of factors that actually does account for the
occurrence of the event. The failure of a candidate explanation to do so
suggests that it cannot be the best explanation of that event. For instance,
an evolutionary ecologist may focus upon the influence of natural selection
on some physical trait in a population. Yet, if selection would have resulted
in the members of the population having trait , but because of a lackP1
of genetic variability they instead have trait , then information aboutP2
the selection pressure cannot by itself fully explain the population having
trait .P2
Such concerns lead to my criteria of explanatory adequacy. These set
the standard of what can qualify as a fully adequate explanation, re-
gardless of the context of inquiry. The two criteria are:
1. Pr(EFC ) ≈ Pr(EFC )expl
2. for all .Pr(EFC ≈ Pr(EF(C ∧ C ) Cexpl expl k k
is the set of causes cited in the candidate explanation of event E. CCexpl
is the broader set of all causal factors that influence E. represents eachCk
event that is a causal influence on E. For this second criterion, these Ck
should be considered both singularly and in combination. These two cri-
teria amount to the idea that, to be fully adequate, an explanation of an
event E must more or less screen off E from all additional causal factors.
For complex causal processes, there potentially will be many subsets of
causal factors that satisfy these criteria, thereby meeting the second con-
dition for a best explanation.
I take these criteria of explanatory adequacy to be rather intuitive. A
fully satisfactory explanation should not omit any causal information that,
if included, would drastically change the expected probability of the event
to be explained. There is the sense that an explanation is not entirely
satisfactory if it wholly neglects a causal factor that makes the event to
be explained much more probable—or, for that matter, much less prob-
able. For this reason, for example, a developmental explanation for the
commonality of a phenotypic trait in the population of interest must,
besides facts of development, give at least a minimal amount of genetic
information. The explanation must at least cite the genetic composition
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of the population. Without information about the proportion of the pop-
ulation with the genotype(s) that cause the organism to develop the phe-
notypic trait in question, the frequency of the trait cannot be predicted
from developmental information.
The third and final condition to be satisfied by best explanations regards
not what should be included in an explanation, but what should be ne-
glected. The best explanation of an event is the most general explanation
that satisfies the first two conditions. The notion of generality that I have
in mind here is similar to Strevens’s, according to which the generality
of a model is “proportional to the standard measure (in the mathematical
sense) of the set of possible physical systems satisfying the model” (2004,
26). I prefer this formulation in terms of the possible—rather than ac-
tual—systems satisfying a model, for this correlates the generality of a
model with the amount of causal detail it incorporates (Strevens 2004).
The causal factors that should be included in an explanation are de-
termined by what sort of causal relationship is of particular interest and
by the criteria of explanatory adequacy. It is best for an explanation to
avoid citing information beyond what these considerations require. Avoid-
ing all information extraneous to the causal relationship of interest and
not required for explanatory adequacy makes as perspicuous as possible
the causal relationship of interest in the context at hand. It is this rela-
tionship that best explains, in the given context of inquiry. Maximizing
generality in this way results in an explanation that is applicable to the
largest set of possible systems that manifest the causal relationship of
interest.
Arguments for the explanatory worth of generality are familiar from
advocates of high level explanation (Putnam 1975; Garfinkel 1981), as
well as from Strevens’s (2004) causal account of explanation. Arguments
against the idea that generality is advantageous to an explanation have
focused on the idea that explanations sometimes benefit from greater
specificity and a corresponding loss of generality (Jackson and Pettit 1992;
Sober 1999). Yet the role of generality in the present account is not sus-
ceptible to this criticism. This is due to the central role of context in
determining the preferable explanation. My claim is not that a certain,
most general explanation always best explains an event. Instead, the degree
and type of an explanation’s allowable generality varies, depending upon
the causal relationship that is of interest in the particular context of inquiry
at hand.
The conditions I have outlined favor explanations that focus only on
what I will call a modular part of the causal process that led to the event
to be explained. I have argued that fully satisfactory explanations should
give information about a causal relationship that is determined by the
interests of the explanation seekers. Such causal relationships potentially
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recur in multiple systems that may differ from one another in other re-
gards. The causes involved are integrated in such a way that they bear
this causal relationship to one another and, thus, together figure into
some causal generalization. This is why it is apt to think of such causal
relationships as modular parts of the causal processes in which they occur.
Any complex causal process includes potentially many modular parts.
This is because many distinct causal relationships are involved in the
causal process, relationships that figure into distinct causal generaliza-
tions. For this reason, the context of inquiry is crucial to establishing the
nature of the best explanation of an event that results from a complex
causal process. The research interests that establish the context of inquiry
focus attention on a particular causal relationship. This determines the
modular part of the causal process that best explains the event in question,
in the context at hand.
3. Explaining Phenotypic Traits. My argument that the optimality ap-
proach has a permanent role to play in evolutionary study proceeds from
the account of best explanations developed in the previous section. Some
evolutionary phenomena are, in certain important contexts of inquiry,
best explained by optimality models. The phenomena that optimality and
game-theoretic models can best explain are the phenotypic outcomes of
long-term evolution by natural selection, provided such a model is ap-
plicable. Optimality explanations qualify as the best explanations of these
sorts of events only in contexts of inquiry that favor the inclusion of
purely phenotypic information. Such contexts arise when researchers seek
to understand the organism-environment interactions and resulting selec-
tion pressures that led to the observed phenotype(s).
In certain circumstances, optimality models meet the conditions for
best explanations that I set out above. The first condition is that the
explanation must represent the causes that figure into the causal rela-
tionship of interest in the relevant context of inquiry. The contexts of
inquiry in which optimality models best explain phenotypic evolutionary
outcomes are those in which the ecological influences on the course of
selection are of particular interest. Such contexts focus attention on the
causal relationship obtaining between (a) natural selection acting on a
certain phenotypic trait, and (b) the value(s) of this trait present in the
population. It is, of course, this very causal relationship that optimality
models represent. The fitness function—and, for game-theoretic models,
the initial distribution of trait values—is used to predict what trait value(s)
will prevail in the population, given the range of possible trait values and
any constraints.
The sort of causal relationship represented by optimality models figures
into a particular kind of causal generalization. Fitness-conferring inter-
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actions between organism and environment have predictable consequences
for the evolution of a population, in certain conditions. Eshel et al. (1998)
and Eshel and Feldman (2001) demonstrate that, provided that the se-
lection regime acting on a phenotypic trait remains constant, “the theory
of long-term evolution predicts convergence to either an optimum or an
ESS (evolutionarily stable strategy) regardless of the genetic system”
(Eshel and Feldman 2001, 186). So long as the selection pressure is con-
stant for a period of time sufficient for the introduction of a large number
of mutations, the predictions of an optimality model can be expected to
obtain. This is not so in instances of short-term evolution or when there
is environmental change which affects fitness values. In these latter cases,
optimality and game-theoretic models will not predictably apply.
This work supports the idea that the causal relationship picked out by
an optimality model figures into a certain kind of causal generalization—
that is, the relationship is predictable, given the satisfaction of certain
assumptions. The information supplied by an optimality model thus qual-
ifies as a modular part of the evolutionary process, in the sense established
above. For the long-term evolutionary change of a population in a con-
stant environment, one can predict the phenotypic trait value(s) in the
population based on information regarding how natural selection acts on
the trait in question. I suggested at the beginning of this section that
instances of this sort of evolutionary change are the proper explananda
for optimality models. Optimality models represent a causal relationship
of particular interest in the given context of inquiry, and this causal re-
lationship figures into a causal generalization applicable to other popu-
lations, populations that might differ in the features that optimality mod-
els neglect.
The second condition outlined above is that a fully satisfactory expla-
nation should meet the criteria of explanatory adequacy. Optimality and
game-theoretic models are typically deterministic models. Thus, when an
optimality model issues an accurate prediction regarding the event to be
explained, then it will satisfy the first criterion of explanatory adequacy.
The second criterion is a bit trickier. Sometimes, even an optimality model
that correctly represents the selection dynamics and issues an accurate
prediction may fail to satisfy this criterion. Yet there are plenty of instances
in which the second criterion is met. Indeed, the customary assumptions
of optimality models succeed for the most part for the same reason that
this condition is met. For instance, the assumption that a particular set
of phenotypes is available typically succeeds when any unrepresented con-
straints do not significantly affect the expected outcome.
Finally, optimality models also meet the third condition outlined above.
That is, optimality models are maximally general explanations of the
designated evolutionary phenomena, in the designated contexts of inquiry,
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within the limits created by meeting the first two conditions. It is this
feature of optimality explanations that differentiates them from competing
explanations that also incorporate genetic information. Such models are
less general than optimality models and thus do not meet this third con-
dition for the explananda and the contexts of inquiry that are my present
focus.
When the focus is on selection as a cause of phenotypic evolutionary
change, certain phenotypic outcomes of long-term evolution by natural
selection are best explained by optimality models. An optimality model
focuses on a particular modular part of the causal process leading to the
observed phenotype. In so doing, it shows how the phenomenon to be
explained fits into a pattern of phenotypic evolutionary change. The ge-
netic causes of a single phenotype may vary, so too might the develop-
mental pathways leading from genotype to phenotype. These are varia-
tions in the causal process by which the phenomenon is brought about.
Yet, regardless of such variability, certain effects can be expected on the
basis of the applicable optimality model (if one in fact is applicable).
As Brown says of game-theoretic models in particular,
Evolutionary game theory offers an exciting perspective on evolution
by natural selection and its consequences. It differs from and com-
plements genetical approaches to evolution by natural selection, in
that game theory places no special value on genetic constraints rel-
ative to the other biophysical constraints that determine the size,
dimension, and character of the strategy set. (Brown 2001, 154)
This holds of optimality models in general. Such models capture how
natural selection works on the available variation in the long-term to
produce certain phenotypic results. The instances of evolution to which
a particular optimality model applies have these results in common, de-
spite potential differences in, for example, details of genetic transmission,
population size, etc. When the action of selection on phenotypes is of
primary interest, optimality models best capture the relevant causal gen-
eralizations.
Incorporating genetic information into models does not add to these
sorts of explanations, but would actually detract from them. An optimality
model highlights a modular part of the causal process that grounds certain
phenotypic generalizations. Incorporating information about other parts
of the causal process can only obfuscate the relationship between the
instance to be explained and other, relevantly similar instances. For this
reason, I disagree with Lewontin’s (1979) assessment that the optimality
approach should be replaced by models explicitly incorporating genetic
dynamics whenever possible. Optimality models will, I submit, always
have an explanatory role to which they are best suited.
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This is, of course, not to say that optimality models are always the best
explanations for evolutionary change. In different contexts of inquiry or
with different explananda, other kinds of information become explana-
torily relevant, for example, genetic or developmental information. Re-
latedly, my point should not be confused with the idea that phenotypic
models are more general than genetic or synthetic genetic-phenotypic
models, and thus better explanations. The context-sensitivity of expla-
nation is an important feature of my view. Genetic models offer their own
sort of generality, and I have no doubt they best explain certain phenom-
ena, in certain contexts of inquiry. Models that bring together genetic and
ecological information probably also best explain certain events in some
contexts of inquiry. Each of these approaches—the purely phenotypic, the
purely genetic, and the synthesis of the two—facilitates its own sort of
evolutionarily valuable causal generalizations.
A good example of an optimality explanation is provided by work done
on the latitudinal variation in the clutch size of birds (Ashmole 1963).
According to The Birder’s Handbook (Ehrlich et al. 1988),
Ornithologist N. P. Ashmole has offered an explanation of [. . .] the
increase in the number of eggs per set from equator to pole. Such
“latitudinal variation” in clutch size is related to the amount of food
produced per unit area of habitat. More specifically, clutch size is
positively related to resource abundance during the breeding season
relative to the density of bird populations (abundance per unit area)
at that time. If, when the birds are not breeding, their population
sizes are limited by food shortages, then population density would
be low at egg-laying time. And if resources increase only slightly
during the breeding season, then natural selection would not favor
large clutches, since food for the hatchlings would be limited. But if
the increase in food were large during the breeding season, then,
everything else being equal, raising a large brood should be possible.
Thus the largest clutches should be found in high latitudes, where
there is an enormous increase in productivity in the spring and sum-
mer (as anyone who has braved northern mosquitoes knows only
too well), and the smallest clutch sizes might be expected in nonsea-
sonal tropical rain forests, where productivity is rather uniform
throughout the year.
In order to explain the latitudinal variation in clutch size observed in
many species of birds, this passage cites information about why this lat-
itudinal difference is advantageous to birds. In high latitudes, there is a
great difference between the resources available in winter and in summer.
This has two results: bird populations dwindle during the winter, and
there are prolific sources of food for birds in the summer. This means
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that hatchlings have access to many resources, and there is a relatively
small amount of competition for these resources. It is thus in birds’ best
evolutionary interest to have large clutches, for it is likely that the en-
vironment will be able to support many hatchlings.
The background for this explanation is the idea that natural selection
favors whatever clutch size will produce the most surviving young, re-
gardless of other features which may vary between individuals, popula-
tions, and species of birds. This is, then, an optimality explanation for
this feature of average clutch size in birds.4 The fact that natural selection
favors a higher number of offspring when the fluctuation between resource
abundance and shortage is largest leads to the observed latitudinal cline
in clutch size.
The causal relationship between selection pressures from fluctuation in
resource abundance and the resultant average clutch size is captured by
an optimality model. In any particular instance of a phenotype becoming
common in a population of birds according to this pattern, much of the
causal process does not appear in the optimality explanation. Perhaps
genotypes causally related to certain clutch sizes are selectively advan-
taged. Perhaps a sort of phenotypic plasticity is instead selected for. De-
velopmental pathways of one sort or another are involved. In various
other contexts, these pieces of the causal process will each deserve their
own focus. But the optimality explanation focuses on one modular part
of the complex causal process, the modular part that figures into a causal
generalization about fluctuation in resource abundance and clutch size.
This generalization is made most perspicuous and is recognized as most
widely applicable when the explanation is kept as general as possible. The
explanation thus rightly neglects other information, for example, about
genetics and development.
In my view, then, the optimality approach has a long-term role assured
in evolutionary study. When plenty of data and computing power are
available, incorporating genetic information may very well lead to better
predictions of evolutionary change. But this does not threaten the ex-
planatory role of the optimality approach. When explaining long-term
phenotypic evolution by natural selection with a particular interest in the
fitness effects of organism-environment interactions, optimality explana-
tion is often a successful approach. Certain questions are simply best
answered by optimality models.
4. As such, it is applicable only when the assumptions of an optimality model are
satisfied. The passage quoted here errs on the side of making the assumption of op-
timality appear universal. This is problematic, given the well-established concerns with
strong forms of adaptationism.
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